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Abstract 
 
This paper examines whether the decline in loans to the private sector in Trinidad and Tobago 
from mid-2009 was caused by a demand-induced or the credit crunch phenomenon. The study 
presents an alternative methodology for estimating the credit crunch. The new methodology 
emphasizes an aggregate banking model in which excess liquidity and interest rate spread are 
important stylized facts. The analytical framework is used to identify shocks to loans and 
deposits that are found to be empirically related to excess liquidity. Using Two-Stage Least 
Squares (TSLS), we estimate auxiliary regressions of random deposit and loan shocks. The 
results suggest that weak loan demand instead of a supply-induced credit crunch best explains 
the decline.  
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1. Introduction 
The level of non-remunerated excess liquidity in the banking system can signal a weakness in the 
demand for loans or a credit crunch in which banks prefer to hoard the non-remunerated asset 
instead of extending marginal quantities of loans.
1
 This argument is also applicable in the case 
where excess reserves are remunerated at a very low interest rate as in the United States (US) 
since October 2008. However, in developing economies this asset typically pays no interest 
(Khemraj, 2010a). Other scholars have observed the phenomenon of excess liquidity in order to 
exploit information signal of a credit crunch (see Agénor et al. 2004; Poghosyan, 2011). The 
credit crunch can result from several supply related factors such as harsh bank supervision 
practices, decline in bank capital, and regulatory burden (Clair and Tucker, 1993). This paper 
adopts this convention and defines a credit crunch as a supply side problem emanating from the 
banks. Credit contraction can also result from weak demand for loans. The contribution of this 
paper is that it provides an alternative methodology for determining whether supply or demand is 
the binding constraint.  
From a policy perspective, it is crucial to distinguish between a supply-driven or demand-
determined slowdown in equilibrium lending. For example, if loan demand is weak the banks 
could either hoard excess reserves or invest in foreign assets providing there is no friction in the 
domestic foreign exchange market. Such a friction can result from a foreign currency constraint 
that causes a mismatch between the demand and supply of scarce foreign currency (Khemraj, 
2009). Similarly, the build-up of excess liquidity could be reflective of a supply-side credit 
                                                          
1
 This paper uses the terms excess reserves and excess liquidity interchangeably. In modern parlance, these are 
essentially excess funding liquidity. The concept of funding liquidity has been a major preoccupation of researchers 
in recent years (see Drehmann and Nikolaou, 2010). Since the central bank provides the liquidity backstop, it is the 
ultimate source of funding liquidity that helps to maintain the market liquidity of financial assets. In most 
developing economies, however, the question of market liquidity is subdued because of the persistent excess bank 
liquidity and the virtual nonexistence of secondary money markets.   
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crunch by banks in which the market loan rate (marginal revenue of lending) falls to the risk-
adjusted marginal cost of lending (Khemraj, 2010a). In this case further liquidity easing will not 
stimulate lending and actually cause commercial banks to invest the excess cash in foreign assets 
once the foreign exchange mismatch is eased.  
This study presents an alternative test that is derived from a structural model of the 
oligopoly banking firm in developing economies. Khemraj (2010b) shows that the excess 
liquidity phenomenon could reflect the oligopoly mark-up interest rate of commercial banks. In 
developing economies, the phenomenon of excess liquidity has been persistent for decades and it 
precedes the relatively recent excess liquidity build-up in the United States owing to quantitative 
easing. This study goes further by showing that an intuitive test of the existence of a credit 
crunch can be derived from the oligopoly model of the banking firm. Trinidad and Tobago data 
are utilized to perform the empirical estimation, since this country was identified to be one in 
which credit contracted sharply during the global financial crisis (2007-2009). Furthermore, 
investigation of the data also shows that in recent years, the quantity of excess liquidity in 
Trinidad and Tobago's banking system has been growing rapidly (see Figure 1).
2
 The method we 
develop can easily be applied to other economies given the prevalence of excess liquidity that 
coincides with a steep contraction in bank lending. Although excess reserves tend to diminish the 
money multiplier and weaken the link between deposits and loans, this work shows that 
estimating the demand for excess liquidity can yield useful information for practical central 
banking.  
In the past, several studies have sought to explain the phenomenon of excess liquidity in 
developing economies. According to Khemraj (2010a), banks’ desire to hoard excess liquidity 
                                                          
2
 The Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago measures excess liquidity as total commercial bank reserves minus 
required reserves.  
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reflects the situation in which the market loan rate falls to equal the risk-adjusted marginal cost 
of lending. In this regime banks demand non-remunerated excess liquidity as a substitute for 
interest-earning loans as is evidenced by a flat liquidity preference curve. The phenomenon could 
also reflect a monetary overhang as rationing in the commodity market forces households to save 
in bank deposits (Caprio and Hanohan, 1993). Saxegaard (2006) estimated empirically several 
structural and risk factors determining the phenomenon in Sub-Saharan Africa. He found that 
excess liquidity can weaken the monetary transmission mechanism and affect the ability of the 
central bank to control inflation. Saxegaard's findings are however different to Jayaraman and 
Choong (2012) who found that a liquidity shock cannot explain changes in inflation in Fiji's 
banking system. 
Furthermore, Maynard and Moore (2005) examined why Barbadian commercial banks 
demand excess liquid assets. Among other factors, the authors found that the build-up of excess 
bank reserves during 1974-2004 was mainly due to the volatility of bank deposits, interest rates 
and the government’s fiscal operations. The issue of excess reserves was also examined in 
Jamaica by Anderson-Reid (2011). Similar to the case of Barbados, Anderson-Reid found that 
the major determinants of excess reserves in Jamaica's banking system include the volatility of 
currency withdrawals and the actions of the government. Also, in The Bahamas, the economic 
decisions undertaken by the government led to the build-up of excess reserves in the banking 
system (see Jordan et al. 2012).  
Moreover, Aikaeli (2006) used an Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) model to 
investigate the determinants of excess liquidity in Tanzania. The results from the empirical 
analysis show that the key factor responsible for the increase in excess liquidity in the long run 
was the reserve requirement ratio. In a recent study, Primus et al. (forthcoming) used 
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Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation to investigate whether commercial banks in 
Trinidad and Tobago demand excess reserves for precautionary purposes. Further, using the 
results from the GMM estimation into a Vector Error Correction (VEC) model, the authors 
examined the dynamic effects of an increase in government expenditure on involuntary excess 
liquidity. The results from the study show that commercial banks demand excess reserves for 
precautionary purposes. Also, an increase in government spending leads to a persistent rise in 
involuntary excess liquidity. In addition, the issue of excess reserves has received attention in 
other developing countries, such as Egypt (see Fielding and Shortland, 2005), Mexico (see 
Jallath-Coria et al. 2005), Turkey (see Tabak and Bankasi, 2006), Cape Verde (see Pontes and 
Sol Murta, 2012), and Indonesia (see Bathaluddin et al. 2012). 
Figure 1. Excess Reserves to Total Reserves in Trinidad and Tobago (2006-2011) 
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herein also utilizes the notion of oligopoly mark-up interest rate at the microeconomic level as 
the basis for the alternative model of a loanable funds market in a bank-dominated financial 
system. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the analytical framework, 
which inspires the identification of the credit crunch. In Section 3 we use Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) to estimate the excess liquidity model and Two-Stage Least Squares (TSLS) to obtain the 
auxiliary regression estimates. This section also presents the findings from the empirical 
estimation. The final section offers some concluding remarks.  
 
2. The Analytical Framework 
There is a large literature searching for the existence of a credit crunch in various economies 
given its importance for policy insights. Much of the theoretical underpinning comes from the 
notion of disequilibrium in the credit market because of asymmetric information problems. At 
the empirical level researchers assume market disequilibrium to decipher whether the observed 
slowdown of credit reflects deficient demand or a supply-induced credit crunch. The pioneering 
application of this approach can be found in the study by Laffont and Garcia (1977). This 
method has found wide applications at central banks and at international organizations. For 
example, the work by Pazarbaşioğlu (1997), Ikide (2003), Allain and Oulidi (2009) and 
Poghosyan (2011) – to cite just a few – have all tried to furnish an answer to this critical question 
using the disequilibrium method.   
Agénor et al. (2004) proposed another approach that involved estimating an empirical 
model of excess bank liquidity. Once the model is estimated, dynamic forecasts of excess 
liquidity are generated over the period the loan market would be observed. The purpose of this 
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method is to use the liquidity projection to determine voluntary versus involuntary excess liquid 
asset demand by commercial banks. Involuntary demand would indicate the slowdown of credit 
is demand-induced while voluntary demand signals a supply-induced reduction of loans.  
Poghosyan (2011) used the excess bank liquidity preference approach of Khemraj (2010a) as a 
robustness check to support his hypothesis of a credit crunch in Jordan. In this approach, a flat 
bank liquidity preference curve is an indication of a credit crunch at which point the market loan 
rate is equal to the risk-adjusted marginal cost of extending loans.  
This paper develops an alternative approach that is based on observing how shocks to 
loans and deposits affect the level of excess bank liquidity. The approach develops a loanable 
funds model from which a structural excess liquidity demand equation can be derived within a 
model that takes into consideration loans, deposits and the persistent spread between the loan and 
deposit rates. The approach allows us to match up the loan and deposit shocks with excess 
liquidity over the sample period that shows a reduction in bank loans to the private sector. 
Therefore, we can see the transition from one regime to another. The disequilibrium model also 
does this but it requires using a sophisticated maximum likelihood estimation routine that is 
dependent on normally distributed regression residuals. The new approach can therefore be an 
intuitive complement for the other methods. Moreover, it can determine whether there is a strong 
credit crunch, weak credit crunch or no credit crunch in which case the build-up of bank liquidity 
is demand-induced. In each case the policy response ought to be different. 
 
2.1 A Diagrammatic Exposition 
The loanable funds model below is applicable to an economy in which banks form the dominant 
source of external finance – a situation which is known to be widespread in developing and some 
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advanced economies. The model takes into consideration two stylized facts of the banking sector 
in developing economies – persistent excess liquidity and interest rate spread (Khemraj, 2010b). 
There is no single interest rate that clears the market for loanable funds. On the one hand, the 
loan rate – assumed to be a mark-up over the marginal cost of lending, a foreign interest rate and 
a probability of borrower default – clears the loan market. On the other hand, the deposit rate – 
assumed to be a mark-up over the foreign interest rate and the liquidity ratio – clears the deposit 
market. In the presence of persistent excess liquidity the foreign risk-free rate becomes the base 
rate and not a local money market rate akin to the US Federal funds rate. However, sometimes 
frictions in the local foreign exchange market will prevent all excess liquidity from being 
invested into a safe foreign asset. The notion of a foreign currency constraint creates these 
mismatches or frictions (Khemraj, 2009). 
In keeping with the notion that the commercial banks possess the market power, the 
banks set the deposit and loan rates and the savers and borrowers, respectively, take these rates 
as given. Effectively therefore the banks supply loans at some minimum mark-up interest rate 
and accept deposits at a maximum interest rate. In this framework the spread is embedded into 
the loanable funds model and no single rate clears the market. The basic model from which 
excess liquidity can be derived to measure the credit crunch is presented below. To understand 
the mechanism by which the interest rates adjust consider the following equations. 
Firstly, the loan rate is given by the following expression,  
 min 1( ( )) / (1 )(1 ( ) )L Fr r m L aN
          (1) 
and secondly the deposit rate is given by,  
 max 1/ (1 )(1 ( ) )D Fr r z bN
           (2) 
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The loan rate is written as a minimum rate, min
Lr , which the banks require for extending a 
marginal quantity of loans, while the deposit rate is the maximum, max
Dr , banks will pay to 
encourage the public to place funds in the banks. 
Fr is the foreign interest rate, ( )m L  denotes the 
marginal cost of loans,   is the probability that borrowers will default, N represents the number 
of banks in the oligopoly industry, a shows borrowers’ elasticity of demand for loans, b denotes 
savers elasticity of supply of deposits, and z is the ratio of non-remunerated liquidity to total 
assets.  
The demand for loans, LD, and supply of deposits, DS, are written in linear form to 
simplify the algebra and derivation of the excess liquidity projection function, as follows:  
 
0
L
D LL L ar             (3) 
 
0
D
S DD D br             (4) 
where 
L is the loan demand shocks assumed to be random          
  , D is the savings 
shocks assumed to be random          
  , and 
0L  and 0D are constants. This basic system can 
be represented in a diagram as in Figure 2. D* and L* are equilibrium quantities of deposits and 
loans, respectively. These are projected by 45
0
 lines in order to obtain the level of excess 
liquidity. The system determines the interest rate spread and excess liquidity endogenously. 
Excess liquidity is determined as *E D L  or according to the following equation: 
                       
           (5) 
where   measures the impact of the net shocks on excess liquidity3. 
It is obvious from the model that a positive shock to savings (outward shift in DS) will 
cause an increase in excess liquidity, ceteris paribus; while a ceteris paribus positive shock in 
                                                          
3
 One way of estimating E is to solve the following minimization problem   2 = (E – E*) 2 for the four parameters a, 
b, D0 – L0 and θ. Where E is the realized excess liquidity and E
*
 is the structural solution above.  
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loan demand (outward shift in LD) will decrease the level of excess liquidity. This fact is 
confirmed with the estimation of the reduced-form regression model later in the paper. However, 
there will be simultaneous shocks in loan demand and savings supply. A reduced-form 
regression will not be able to untangle the existence of a credit crunch. Therefore, a more 
structural approach has to be implemented whereby we must estimate the random deposit and 
loan shocks. However, equation (5) shows the important role the deposit and loan shocks play in 
the system determining liquidity. Below we outline the various types of credit crunch. 
Figure 2. The Market for Loanable Funds 
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2.2 Identifying the Credit Crunch 
The method used for identifying the credit crunch is motivated by Figure 2. The objective is to 
compare loan demand and deposit supply shocks. One of the other cited methods looks at 
estimating whether disequilibrium exists in the loanable funds market; however, our method 
does not require disequilibrium. The final method involves estimating an excess liquidity 
demand function. Figure 2 allows us to outline various scenarios pertaining to the existence or 
non-existence of the credit crunch.    
 In the case of a strong credit crunch, there is a positive shock to
L but excess liquidity 
rises because of a greater concomitant positive shock to
D . This is a sign that banks are 
hoarding excess liquidity at some threshold interest rate. In terms of Figure 2, the LD curve shifts 
outward; the DS curve also shifts outward but to a higher level that causes excess liquidity to rise. 
When there is a weak credit crunch, there is a positive shock to
L but excess liquidity falls either 
because of a negative shock to
D or the positive shock to L  is greater than a positive shock to
D . This implies the outward shift in LD is greater than the outward shift in DS. Finally, for the 
case when there is no credit crunch, a negative shock to
L indicates an inward shift in the 
demand for loans in spite of the nature of the deposit shocks. This implies the slowdown in credit 
is purely due to weakness in the demand for loans. 
 
3. Empirical Estimation and Results 
This section estimates a reduced-form regression using OLS, to measure whether the predictions 
of Figure 2 can be found in the actual data. It then presents graphical support to decide whether a 
credit crunch can account for the slowdown in credit to the private sector. Furthermore, using the 
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method of TSLS, we estimate auxiliary regressions to obtain the results from the loan and 
deposit shocks. The sample comprises monthly data from January 1995 to September 2011.  
 
3.1 Regression Estimates 
The regression takes the following form: 
                        
      
              (6) 
Et, which represents excess reserves, is measured as total reserves divided by required reserves. 
The loan rate, rLt, is included in the empirical model because it measures the opportunity cost of 
holding excess liquidity. By demanding excess liquidity the banks are losing the return on 
lending at the said rate. The prime lending rate is used to proxy the opportunity cost variable. Z is 
a vector of other determinants of excess liquidity, namely volatility of demand deposits and 
macroeconomic volatility. These variables are used to measure the effect of uncertainty on 
banks’ demand for excess liquidity (see Agénor et al. 2004).  
Demand deposit and total deposit volatility are measured by a GARCH (1, 1) model of 
demand deposit, while macroeconomic uncertainty is approximated by a GARCH (1, 1) measure 
of the Trinidad and Tobago stock market index. From the auxiliary regressions (equations (7) 
and (8)),   
  and   
  are estimated using TSLS because of the endogenous relationship between 
the relevant interest rates, loans and deposits.  
 
0 0 1 1
L
t Lt t tL L a r a L             (7) 
 
0 0 1 1
D
t Dt t tD D b r b D             (8) 
The following coefficient values are expected:                        . The 
volatility measures are expected to have a positive effect on excess liquidity; therefore the vector 
  includes parameters that are all positive. We estimated the auxiliary regressions with lagged 
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dependent variables so as to make the residuals normally distributed and serially uncorrelated. 
These residuals are the proxy for loan and deposit shocks that are important for equation (6). 
Following Figure 2, the auxiliary regressions should have the following coefficient restrictions: 
0 0a   and 0 0b  .  
Table 1 reports the regression results of equation (6). This is the final model that was 
obtained after a more general specification with up to four lags. The model was simplified using 
Wald F-tests. This model has an adjusted R
2
 of 0.7 and all coefficients are statistically 
significant, expect the coefficient on the loan rate that turned out to be marginally significant 
with a p-value of 0.053. These estimates are all based on robust standard errors correcting for 
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. None of the volatility measures was found to be 
statistically significant, except aggregate deposit volatility. However, while this volatility 
measure had a low p-value – hence statistical significance – it does not reflect economic 
significance given the very small coefficient. The other coefficients, however, indicate economic 
significance and correct signs. In keeping with Figure 2, deposit supply shocks are positively 
related to excess liquidity, while loan demand shocks are negatively related. The loan interest 
rate exerts a negative influence on excess liquidity in keeping with the hypothesis that this rate 
reflects the opportunity costs of hoarding liquid assets.  
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Table 1. Results for Excess Liquidity Regression 
Dependent Variable: Excess reserves 
  HAC Standard Errors & Covariance      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-statistics P-value 
Constant 72.1000 8.8200 8.1700 0.0000 
Loan rate -0.4760 0.2400 -1.9500 0.0530 
Shock_loan -0.0220 0.0000 -9.5600 0.0000 
Shock_deposit 0.0530 0.0100 5.5800 0.0000 
Volatility_deposit 0.0000 0.0000 6.8100 0.0000 
Excess Reserves (-1) 0.3530 0.0800 4.4900 0.0000 
Adj_R-square 0.7       
 
Table 2 presents the results for the two estimated auxiliary regressions. The estimated 
residual shocks were inserted into the second-stage estimation given in Table 1 above. The 
coefficient on the loan rate is statistically and economically significant with a low p-value and an 
estimated coefficient of -19.74. The deposit rate has a positive coefficient, 8.87, but is 
statistically insignificant given the p-value of 0.137. The standard errors are robust standard 
errors. The instruments used in each regression are reported in Table 2; they include lagged 
values of the variables, a seasonal dummy, and a linear time trend to reflect the trending nature 
of the loan and deposit series. This strategy is recommended when applying TSLS to time-series 
data (see Wooldridge, 2009). Furthermore, in the TSLS process, the first-stage estimates give 
very high F-statistic values, therefore suggesting that the existence of weak instruments is less of 
a problem. The very small J-statistic indicates the null hypothesis that the instruments are 
exogenous cannot be rejected.  
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Table 2. Results for Auxiliary Regressions 
Dependent variable: Loans 
   HAC Standard Errors & Covariance 
  Instrument list: Constant,  Loan(-1), Trend, Loan rate(-1) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-statistics P-value 
Constant 398.3000 256.5400 1.5520 0.1220 
Loan rate -19.7400 4.5500 -4.3380 0.0000 
Loan (-1) 0.9930 0.0070 141.0700 0.0000 
Trend 2.1170 1.4890 1.4200 0.1570 
J-statistic 0.0 
   First stage F-statistic  1754.0       
  Dependent Variable: Deposits 
  
HAC Standard Errors & Covariance 
  Instrument list: Deposit rate(-1), Deposit(-1), Trend, Dummy12  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-statistics P-value 
Constant -130.1000 493.4280 -0.2640 0.7920 
Deposit rate 8.8700 5.7700 1.5370 0.1370 
Deposit (-1) 1.0000 0.0100 100.5000 0.0000 
Trend 5.6300 3.2990 1.7060 0.0900 
Dummy12 591.8000 297.6000 1.9880 0.0480 
J-statistic 0.0 
   First stage F-statistic  890.0       
 
 In estimating the auxiliary regressions in levels, we are faced with the conflict between 
econometric method and the structural relevance embedded in Figure 2. The trending nature of 
the loan and deposit series would suggest non-stationary time series. Figure 2 expresses the 
variables in levels so as to identify shocks in the level of the data. One possibility of correcting 
the trending data would be to difference the series. However, differencing will result in losing 
the essence of Figure 2. Therefore, we decided to proceed with the levels of the series. In 
estimating the regressions, we controlled for a time trend and incorporated a seasonal dummy 
variable to capture the end of year economic activities – that is dummy12.  On theoretical 
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grounds we expect the interest rate to revert to its long-term natural rate. In this case, given our 
small sample size, the interest rate may not fully adjust to its long-term equilibrium.  
 
3.2 Deciphering a Credit Crunch  
Although the empirical results given above show consistency between the analytical model and 
the data, they cannot say whether the build-up of excess liquidity reflects a credit crunch or 
weakness in demand for loans. This section proposes a method that looks at shocks in deposits 
and loans as the former are the main source of financing for loans in a bank-dominated economy 
in which there is virtually no money market funding of bank loans. Figure 3 shows a turning 
point in loans to the private sector from 2009. For the purpose of completeness we also present 
the level of deposits over the same period. The task of this paper is to figure out whether the flat 
lending reflects demand weakness or is supply-induced.  
Figure 3. Loans and Deposits (2006-2011) 
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Figure 4 presents the shocks to deposits and loans (in millions of TT$) along with excess 
reserves, which is shown by a percentage above 100%. Given the observed facts in Figure 3, we 
are particularly interested in explaining the reason for the flatness in private sector loans from 
around mid-2009. The loan demand shocks are shown by the red line graph. Starting from mid-
2009, September and December of that year saw positive demand shocks. In 2010 the loan 
demand shocks turned negative and persistent. While the negative demand shocks continued for 
2011, there was a turnaround in August and September as the shocks turned positive. Therefore, 
we can conclude that the negative loan demand shocks were overwhelming as shown by the red 
line in the negative territory. This finding is more consistent with a demand-induced slowdown 
in private sector loans instead of a credit crunch. Another point to note is there was not a flat 
bank liquidity preference curve over the period of interest as Poghosyan (2011) found for Jordan 
when the credit crunch thesis held up. Instead of a flat curve it is downward sloping, thereby 
suggesting that banks are still willing to trade off non-remunerated excess liquidity for loans but 
are prevented from doing so because of the weak demand. 
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Figure 4. Deposit and Loan Shocks (Left-Axis) and Excess Reserves (Right -Axis) 
 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
This work presented an alternative method of identifying a credit crunch when there is a 
noticeable decline in loans to the private sector as occurred in Trinidad and Tobago from mid-
2009. The method presented does not need to assume that the credit market is in disequilibrium 
nor do we need the maximum likelihood estimator to be deployed. Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) is enough to estimate the excess liquidity model (equation (6)) and Two-Stage Least 
Squares (TSLS) can estimate the auxiliary regressions with instruments coming from embedded 
trends in the data and ex post lags. The shocks or shifts in loans and deposits help us to identify 
whether the slowdown occurred because of a weakness in demand or a credit supply problem. 
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bank dominated financial system, which has persistent excess liquidity and interest rate spread, 
two known features in many liberalized financial sectors of developing countries. The results 
from the empirical analysis suggest that the contraction in private sector loans from mid-2009 is 
best explained by a decline in demand for bank credit.  
The technique developed in this paper can be helpful to policy makers who manage the 
excess liquidity on a weekly basis as part of a financial programming or reserve money program 
framework. If it is found that the forecast of loan demand shock is negative it makes little sense 
"mopping up" excess liquidity in the next period. However, the monetary authority still has to 
determine how elastic is the relationship between liquidity and commercial banks’ demand for 
foreign assets (see Khemraj, 2009). Positive shocks to the demand for loans but an increase in 
excess liquidity would tend to signal a credit crunch and the policy response would need to be 
different compared with when there is weakness in the demand for bank loans.  
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